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ABSTRACT 
A major budget reform proposal that is being studied, and has been 
implemented within the Department of Defense (DoD) is biennial budgeting. The 
Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 Defense Authorization Act directed DoD to submit two-year 
defense budgets beginning in FY 1988. Although relatively a new development for 
the federal government, many states have used biennial budgeting for years. 
Although budget size, scope, procedure, and form vary among states and between 
states and the federal government, certain successful attributes of biennial 
budgeting at the state level may be applied to biennial budgeting at the federal 
level. The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview and analysis of biennial 
budgeting within DoD and the federal government. This study examines the effects 
of biennial budgeting on the Department of the Navy's budget planning and 
implementation process and Program Objectives Memorandum development. The 
realized benefits and limitations of biennial budgeting since DoD became the first 
federal agency to prepare two-year budgets are also explored. Biennial budgeting 
at the federal and state levels are compared, including a discussion of relevant 
attributes of state biennial budgeting experiences that may be applied to the federal 
budget process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
As the size and complexity of the annual federal budget 
have increased over the past 50 years, lawmakers have been 
spending an increasing amount of time and resources on the 
annual budget process. The Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Act of 1974 provided a more structured role for 
Congress in preparing and analyzing the budget, by instituting 
a budget timetable, establishing two Congressional budget 
committees, and shifting the fiscal year in an effort to 
formalize and strengthen the budget process (Anderson, 1987, 
pp. 11). Despite this Act and the additional time and effort 
devoted to budget issues, Congress has often been unable to 
pass authorization bills on schedule, resorting to continuing 
resolutions at the beginning of fiscal years. In addition, the 
vast amount of attention given to the budget process by 
legislators has detracted from the time lawmakers need to 
spend on non-budget issues and activities. 
A major budget reform proposal that is being studied by 
politicians, and has been implemented within the Department of 
Defense (DoD) is biennial budgeting. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 
Defense Authorization Act directed DoD to submit a two year 
defense budget starting with FY 1988 and FY 1989. These 
biennial budget submissions by DoD have met with limited 
success. Under the current process of biennial budgeting 
within DoD, authorizations and appropriations are still 
executed annually even though the Defense Department must 
submit two annual budgets (two individual budgets, one for 
each fiscal year in the biennium) to Congress once every two 
years. In the off year the Pentagon presents an amended 
defense budget via the administration to Congress in early 
February, four months into the start of the biennial period. 
The movement towards a biennial budgeting cycle has 
recently been gaining support by various organizations in 
Washington. The Vice President's National Performance Review 
(NPR) is recommending that the entire budget cycle be changed 
from an annual to a biennial process. Under this system the 
President would present budgets every two years, authorization 
committees would approve full multi-year budgets, budget 
resolutions would be adopted every two years and 
appropriations would be established for the entire biennial 
period. (Gore, 1993, pp. 17) 
In recent testimony before Congress the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) offered support for portions of the 
NPR's biennial budgeting proposal, specifically associated 
with multi-year authorizations and budget resolutions. In 
contrast to the NPR's promotion of biennial appropriations, 
GAO supports a continued annual appropriations cycle. (Irving, 
1994, pp. 6-7) 
The NPR and GAO proposals, in addition to the recent 
views and recommendations on the implementation and structure 
of a biennial budgeting process made by the Joint (House and 
Senate) Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC), and 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), will be discussed in 
depth in Chapter II of this thesis. 
Although a relatively new development for the federal 
government, many states have used biennial budgeting for 
years. In 1940, 44 states operated under a two-year budget 
cycle. Currently 2 0 states utilize a biennial budget, however, 
the characteristics and methods of implementing those budgets 
vary greatly among states. Of the 20 states that utilize a 
biennial budgeting cycle, seven have biennial legislative 
cycles and therefore could not operate under an annual 
budgeting schedule (Irving, 1994, pp. 2). 
Although budget size, scope, procedure, and form vary 
among states and between states and the federal government, 
certain successful attributes of biennial budgeting at the 
state level may be applied to biennial budgeting at the 
federal level. These issues will be addressed in Chapter IV. 
The current administration and Congressional supporters 
feel that a biennial budget would provide lawmakers additional 
needed time to carefully formulate and enact the budget, 
enhance program funding stability within DoD, and provide 
legislators an increased amount of time to deal with non- 
budget issues. Opponents argue that biennial budgeting reduces 
the flexibility and responsiveness needed to react to changes 
in economic and national interest issues and under a policy of 
biennial appropriations, would reduce Congressional control 
over the budget. An analysis of biennial budgeting including 
a detailed study of these and other realized benefits and 
limitations of a two-year budget cycle will be addressed in 
Chapter III. 
B.  OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview and 
analysis of biennial budgeting within DoD and the federal 
government. This study will explore the realized benefits and 
limitations of biennial budgeting since DoD became the first 
federal agency to prepare two-year budgets. This thesis will 
also examine the effects of biennial budgeting on the Defense 
Department's Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) development 
and budget preparation process. A comparison of biennial 
budgeting at the federal level with biennial budgeting at the 
state level will also be made, including a discussion of 
relevant attributes of state biennial budgeting experiences 
that may be applied to the federal budget process. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis is: 
• What effect has biennial budgeting had on the 
Department of the Navy's budget planning and 
implementation process? 
The following subsidiary research questions were 
developed to help clarify and supplement the principal 
research question: 
• What have been the realized advantages and limitations 
of biennial budgeting within DoD and the Department of 
the Navy (DoN)? 
• What changes to POM development within DoN has biennial 
budgeting caused? 
• What are the relevant attributes of state biennial 
budgeting experiences that may be applied to the 
federal biennial budget process? 
• Given the current political and budgetary climate, what 
is the likely future progression of biennial budgeting 
in DoD and in the federal government? 
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The focus of this thesis will be to asses the effect of 
biennial budgeting on DoN's budget planning and implementation 
process since the first two-year budget submission and to 
forecast the likely effects and outcomes of biennial budgeting 
at the federal level. 
Additionally, this study will develop comparisons between 
federal and state biennial budgeting attributes, and explore 
relevant characteristics of state biennial budgeting 
experiences that may be applied to the federal biennial budget 
process. 
Relatively little has been written on biennial budgeting 
in DoD and the federal government since DoD's first two-year 
budget submission for FY 1988 and FY 1989. As a result, I have 
relied on interviews with federal budget professionals in 
forming much of my analysis of the effects of biennial 
budgeting on DoN's budget planning and implementation process 
and in forecasting the likely effects and outcomes presented 
in Chapter III. 
The reason little has been written recently on biennial 
budgeting is not surprising. The implementation of a biennial 
budgeting cycle in DoD initially drew a great deal of interest 
and attention from budget observers and experts. Even though 
the conference on the authorization bill authorized 60% of the 
$200, billion FY 1989 budget request, no money was appropriated 
at that time for 1989 (Hamre, 1990, pp. 71) . In future 
biennial budget submissions authorization committees would no 
longer authorize any portion of the off year when it became 
clear that congress would not appropriate for the second year 
in a two-year DoD budget. As a result, interest in biennial 
budgeting died out, and students of the defense and federal 
budget process focused their studies and written works on more 
pressing and viable issues. 
E.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Bibliographical searches for articles, papers, 
Congressional hearings and other works relating to biennial 
budgeting, two year budgets and budget reform were conducted 
at the Naval Postgraduate School Library using BOSUN, The 
Defense Logistics Studies Information Center (DLSIC), the 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and the Computer 
Search Services. GOPHER (the Internet) was also used. This 
study began with an in depth analysis of the literature that 
resulted from the above searches to gain an understanding of 
biennial budgeting issues. 
I have also conducted comprehensive phone interviews with 
branch heads from the Navy Comptroller's office (NAVCOMPT), 
budget officers and deputy comptrollers of major claimants, 
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) budget analysts, and House and Senate 
Authorization Committee and Appropriations Defense 
Subcommittee staff members. 
Following the phone interviews the information obtained 
was studied and interpreted, and follow up phone calls were 
made to clarify certain points. The input of thesis advisors 
was employed throughout this work to develop fundamental 
research questions and issues and to help guide the study. 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I. Introduction: This chapter begins with a 
broad background and overview of biennial budgeting. It also 
identifies the purpose of the study, states the research 
questions and presents a general outline of the thesis. The 
methodology used in developing this thesis is also presented. 
Chapter II. Background: This chapter will provide 
historical background on biennial budgeting in the DoD. 
Included in this chapter are the events that led to the 
Defense Department's first two-year budget, the biennial 
budget submission process, and congressional response since 
the first submission. Recent proposals and the foundation of 
the current resurgence in support for a two-year budget cycle 
will also be investigated. 
Chapter III. Analysis of the Effects of Biennial 
Budgeting: The effects of a two-year budget cycle on DoN's 
budget formulation and implementation process and how it has 
impacted the POM process will be explored. Realized advantages 
and disadvantages of biennial budgeting in DoN and the likely 
future progression of biennial budgeting in DoD and in the 
federal government are also examined. 
Chapter IV. Biennial Budgeting at the State Level: 
Similarities and Differences between biennial budgeting at the 
federal and state levels are explored, as well as relevant 
attributes of state biennial budgeting experiences that may be 
applied to the federal biennial budget process. Trends in 
biennial budgeting at the state level, factors affecting 
whether states use biennial budgeting, and lessons learned 
from state biennial budgeting will also be presented. 
Chapter V. Conclusions: A summary and conclusions drawn 
from the study are presented along with possible further 
research recommendations. 
This study will provide an analysis of the effects of 
biennial budgeting on DoD budget planning and implementation 
and whether biennial budgeting has been effective for DoD. 
Comparisons to biennial budgeting at the state level will be 
made. This study may provide additional insight into, and 
identify long term feasibility and characteristics of biennial 
budgeting. 

II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide historical background on 
biennial budgeting in the federal government and in the 
Department of Defense (DoD). Included in this chapter are 
prominent past and present biennial budgeting proposals, in 
addition to the recent views and recommendations on the 
implementation and structure of a two-year budgeting process 
made by the General Accounting Office and the Congressional 
Budget Office. The events that led to the Defense Department's 
first two-year budget, the biennial budgeting process, and 
congressional response since the first submission, will also 
be discussed in this chapter. 
B. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A BIENNIAL BUDGET 
In response to the growing size and increasing complexity 
of the annual federal budget since 1950, Congress has revised 
its approach to the oversight and analysis of the budget 
process over the last several years. 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
provided a more structured role for Congress in preparing and 
analyzing the budget. The act instituted a budget timetable, 
established two Congressional budget committees, and shifted 
the start of the fiscal year from 1 July to 1 October 
(Anderson, 1987, pp. 11), in an effort to formalize and 
enhance the budget process. In the years following this act, 
frustration over the federal budget process continued. "The 
perceptions are that the current annual budget process is too 
time consuming and cumbersome, has an unrealistic timetable, 
lacks the means to ensure compliance, and crowds out time for 
oversight and other legislative activities" (Comptroller of 
the United States, 1984, pp. 4). 
Despite the passage of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Act and the additional time and effort devoted to 
budget issues, Table 1 shows that Congress has been able to 
pass defense appropriation bills on schedule only three times 
since 1977. Congress has routinely resorted to passing 
continuing resolutions, which are intended to provide a way 
for DoD (or any agency) to continue operating while Congress 
analyzes and enacts the current Fiscal Year (FY) 
appropriations bill. 
Fiscal Year   Effective Date 
1977 22 September 1976 
1978 21 September 1977 
1979 13 October 1978 
1980 21 December 1979 
1981 15 December 1980 
1982 29 December 1981 
1983 21 December 1982 
1984 8 December 1983 
1985 12 October 1984 
1986 9 December 1985 
1987 18 October 1986 
1988 22 December 1987 
1989 1 October 1988 
1990 21 November 1989 
1991 5 November 1990 
1992 26 November 1991 
1993 6 October 1992 
1994 11 November 1993 
Table 1. Dates of Enactment; Department of Defense 
Appropriations Acts FY 1977 through FY 1994. 
FY 1977-1986 from: Anderson, 1987, pp. 21. 
FY 1987-1993 from: U.S. Statutes at Large 1986-1993. 
FY 1994 from: Congressional Quarterly, 1993, pp. 3135 
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A major contributing factor to Congress' inability to 
pass defense appropriations bills on time, is the immense size 
and complexity of the DoD budget. 
The intricacy of the defense budget is evident by the 
vast number of programs and line items in the DoD budget that 
are reviewed and analyzed by the Authorization committees, 
Appropriation subcommittees, and their staffs. For example, 
the FY 1995 Defense Authorization bill contains approximately 
700 Research, Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) line 
items, over 12 0 0 defense procurement line items and hundreds 
of additional line items in the remaining components of the 
defense budget (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Armed Services: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
1995; House Report 103-499; May 10, 1994). 
The Magnitude of the defense budget also contributes to 
the problem of timely appropriation bill passage. For FY 1993, 
the total defense budget authority made up in excess of 19% 
($281.1 billion) of the total federal government budget 
authority of $1473.6 billion (National Defense Budget 
Estimates for FY 1995, March 1994, pp. 6-10). 
Critics of the budget process charge that Congress, 
particularly the authorization committees, spend too much time 
budgeting and not enough time developing national defense 
policy and setting program funding levels for appropriation 
committees. In a speech on the floor of the Senate, Senator 
Sam Nunn (D) of Georgia asserted that members of Congress are 
"acting more and more like national program managers in their 
oversight of defense. . .focusing on grains of sand on the beach 
while we should be looking over the broad ocean and beyond" 
(Nunn, 1985, pp. 197-198). 
In a 1984 interview, prior to becoming the chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn stated: 
The budget cycle drives the Congress,  and the 
Congress drives the executive branch to such an 
11 
Obsession that we don't have time to think about 
strategy. We never had a strategy hearing since 
I've been in the Senate (Nunn, 1984, pp. 614). 
Nunn went on to say that moving toward a two-year defense 
budget is vital to reinforcing the Authorization committee's 
oversight role and that he would push the defense department 
to submit biennial budgets (Gordon, 1984, pp. 614) . 
Little has changed in the decade since Senator Nunn made 
the above comments. At a hearing before the Legislation and 
National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government 
Operations; House of Representatives on October 7 1993, 
Congressman William Clinger (R) of Pennsylvania, while 
expressing his concerns over the way Congress manages the 
budget process, stated: "Congress spends far too much time 
debating spending proposals and far too little time looking at 
how well that money is spent" (Clinger, 1993, pp. 2) . 
Disappointment in the complexity of and excessive time 
spent on the annual budget process has continued to grow over 
time. 
Throughout the...years, one conviction has united 
Congress and the administration, Republicans and 
Democrats, liberals and conservatives: a growing 
disaffection with the way the federal government 
reviews and adopts annual budgets. The process is 
cumbersome, duplicative, and unending. Controversy 
in one fiscal year spills into the next (Hamre, 
1990, pp. 71). 
The frustration and disaffection over the annual budget 
process was the impetus for many in Congress and in 
administrations, past and present, to support a move toward a 
biennial budgeting process. 
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C.  EARLY PROPOSALS FOR A FEDERAL BIENNIAL BUDGET 
Since 1977 Congressional advocates of budget reform have 
submitted dozens of bills that would establish a biennial 
budgeting cycle in one form or another for the federal 
government. These bills varied mainly in the timing of budget 
events within the biennial cycle, and in whether 
appropriations would be passed for a two-year period or remain 
an annual occurrence (Hamre, 1990, pp. 72). Prominent 
proposals from the start of the biennial budgeting movement 
will now be presented. 
1.  The Panetta Proposal 
Former Congressman Leon Panetta (D) of California 
sponsored a biennial budgeting bill in the mid-1980's that 
featured authorization and appropriation bills that cover a 
two-year budget period. Under this proposal lawmakers would 
conduct oversight of the budget in the first session of a new 
Congress, and perform budget formulation functions in the 
second session. 
One drawback of the Panetta biennial budgeting proposal 
is that a new President and new Congress would receive close 
to two years of the preceding Congress' and administration's 
budget to operate under. If election results reflected a 
desired change by voters in the policy course for the nation, 
lawmakers would doubtlessly pass supplemental authorization 
and appropriation acts patterned after voters desires, 
eliminating the fundamental benefit of a biennial budget: 
maintaining program stability. 
Anther disadvantage is that this proposal would position 
budget votes in election years, a time when lawmakers running 
for another term in office would be less likely to make tough 
budget cutback decisions (Anderson, 1987, pp. 31-32). 
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2.  The Roth Bill 
Senator William Roth (R) of Delaware introduced a 
biennial budgeting bill in the 98th Congress similar to the 
Panetta proposal in that it provided an appropriation period 
covering a single two-year period. In this bill, however, 
budget oversight would occur in the second year following 
budget formulation and actions accomplished in the first 
session of a new Congress (Anderson, 1987, pp. 32-33). 
In 1984 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) endorsed 
the properties of a biennial budgeting process that were 
present in Senator Roth's bill for the following reasons 
(quote): 
• Places difficult budget votes in non-election years. 
• Allows adoption of the budget in the first year of new 
members of Congress. 
• Allows the budget to be adopted during the first year 
of a President's term every other biennium, providing 
the opportunity to swiftly implement a new President's 
program. 
• Leaves the second session of a Congress relatively free 
for oversight. (Comptroller of the United States, 1984, 
pp. 6) 
As mentioned earlier, proponents of budget reform have 
introduced several variations of biennial budgeting bills 
since the late 1970's. These bills varied mainly in the timing 
of budget milestones within the biennial cycle, and in 
appropriation bill frequency and duration. Almost all were 
derivations of the two predominant bills mentioned above. The 
next section will explore current proposals and views in the 
push for a federal biennial budget. 
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D.  RECENT FEDERAL BIENNIAL BUDGETING PROPOSALS AND VIEWS 
1.   The Vice President's National Performance Review 
Biennial Budgeting Proposal 
In From Red Tape  to Results:   Creating a  Government   that 
Works     Better    and    Costs     Less;     Report     of     the    National 
Performance Review,   Vice President AL Gore states: 
Annual budgets consume an enormous amount of 
management time-time not spent serving customers. 
With biennial budgets, rather than losing months to 
a frantic "last-year's budget-plus-X-percent" 
exercise, we might spend more time examining which 
programs actually work....In Congress 7 out of 10 
members favor a biennial process with a two-year 
budget resolution and multi-year authorizations. 
The time is ripe. (Gore, 1993, pp. 17) 
The National Performance Review (NPR) biennial budgeting 
proposal recommends that the entire budget cycle be changed 
from an annual to a biennial.process. Under this system the 
President would present budgets every two years, authorization 
committees would approve multi-year budgets, budget 
resolutions would be adopted every two years and 
appropriations would be established for the entire biennial 
period (Gore, 1993, pp. 17). 
Given that former Congressman Panetta was the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) at the time that 
Vice President Gore presented the administration's biennial 
budgeting proposal, similarities between Panetta's bill and 
the administration's proposal are not surprising. Under the 
proposal presented by Vice President Gore, lawmakers would 
conduct oversight of the budget in the first session of a new 
Congress, and perform budget formulation functions including 
budget submission, budget resolution, and appropriations in 
the second session (Blum, 1994, pp. 1). 
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In October 1993 the then Director of OMB, Leon Panetta, 
testified before the House Committee on Government Operations- 
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, on the 
Clinton administration's biennial budgeting proposal. He 
detailed the five most significant ways that biennial 
budgeting would improve the way government works 
(paraphrased): 
. Stability and Rationality: Small and predictable annual 
changes in accounts could be decided two years at a 
time saving tremendous time and effort. With the work 
intensive portion of the budget completed in the first 
year, lawmakers could concentrate on the many other 
(non-budget) issues that need to be confronted. 
Modifications to the off-year's figures could be 
accomplished in a supplemental bill. 
. Better Management: Biennial budgeting would reduce the 
amount of resources allocated to budgeting and allow 
managers more time to consider their programs and 
policies. 
• Oversight: A two-year budget cycle would allow 
lawmakers and agencies to conduct honest examination 
and analysis of funded programs. 
. Predictability: More predictable funding levels, 
benefiting administrators and recipients of government 
programs. 
• Less Waste: Under a biennial budgeting cycle there 
would be less opportunity to pass pork-barrel spending 
programs. (Mr. Panetta conceded that the amount 
currently spent on pork would not necessarily be 
curbed; just the number of chances for it to happen.) 
(Panetta, 1993, pp. 12-18). 
Since the first federal biennial budgeting bill in 1977, 
the anticipated advantages (such as those mentioned by Mr. 
Panetta above, and those envisioned by the Congress and 
Pentagon in Section E. below) and limitations (which will be 
presented in Congressional Budget Office testimony latter in 
this section) of a two-year budget cycle have been describe in 
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numerous articles and proposals. In Chapter III of this thesis 
I will focus on the realized benefits and weaknesses of 
biennial budgeting in DoD from the perspective of managers 
affiliated with the defense budget process, where two-year 
budget submissions have been prepared since the 1988/1989 
biennium. 
2. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress' 
Biennial Budgeting Proposal 
The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress 
(JCOC) developed a biennial budgeting proposal in 1993, 
introduced by Chairman David Boren (D) of Oklahoma and Vice 
Chairman Pete Domenici (R) of New Mexico, and included in S. 
1824. The biennial budgeting recommendation cultivated by the 
JCOC is very similar to the administration's proposal with the 
exception of a different milestone timetable. Under the JCOC 
plan, budget formulation and actions would be performed in the 
first session of a new Congress, followed by budget oversight 
in the second year (Blum, 1994, pp. 1). 
The NPR and JCOC proposals are not surprisingly, opposed 
by many members of the powerful Appropriations Committees 
including Senate Chairman Robert Byrd (D) of West Virginia. 
Even some members of the JCOC contest the multi-year 
appropriations provision in S. 1824 (Congressional Quarterly, 
1994, pp. 316-317). 
3. The General Accounting Office's Reaction to the 
Clinton Administration's and the JCOC's Biennial Budgeting 
Proposals 
In  recent  testimony  before  Congress,  the  General 
Accounting Office (GAO) offered support for portions of the 
administration's and the JCOC's biennial budgeting proposals, 
specifically associated with multi-year authorizations and 
budget resolutions. In contrast to the NPR's and JCOC's 
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promotion of multi-year appropriations, GAO supports a 
continued annual appropriations cycle (Irving, 1994, pp. 1-2). 
In her opening remarks before the Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration, GAO's Associate Director of Budget 
Issues cautioned: 
Although there is virtually universal agreement 
that the current (budget) process has problems, 
changes must be carefully considered. In fact, the 
current process is, in part, the cumulative result 
of many changes made to address previous problems. 
The challenge is to design solutions to existing 
problems without creating new ones (Irving, 1994, 
pp. 1). 
The GAO concludes that biennial budget policy agreements 
and authorizations make sense, but that although there could 
be time savings for executive branch agencies if multi-year 
appropriations were enacted, a shift in Congressional 
authority and oversight could result. "Proposals to change the 
process should be viewed partly in the context of their effect 
on the relative balance of power in this debate." (Irving, 
1994, pp. 3) . 
4. The Congressional Budget Office's Reaction to the 
Clinton Administration's and the JCOC's Biennial Budgeting 
Proposals 
In evaluating the potential effects of each of the above 
biennial budgeting proposals, the Deputy Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) discussed the following key 
topics in great detail before the Senate Committee on Rules 
and Administration. 
a. Biennial Budget Resolutions 
Biennial budget resolutions would increase the 
probability that budget estimates would be based on economic 
and policy decisions that could be erroneous. Biennial budget 
resolutions would require calculating changes in the economy 
and baseline budget 33 months before the end of that fiscal 
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year, as opposed to 21 months under annual resolutions (which 
is difficult enough). Enforcing the budget resolution could 
also pose a potential problem as the assumptions used to 
develop the resolution become dated (Blum, 1994, pp. 1-2). 
Jb. Biennial Appropriations 
Executive agencies and recipients of federal funds 
would benefit from the increased flexibility and ability to 
plan further into the future (program stability) that multi- 
year appropriations would afford. In addition, managers would 
be able to spend more time evaluating the effectiveness of 
their programs especially in the off-year. Contracts 
negotiated between the government and industry could be 
negotiated at a better price if a multi-year commitment could 
be made, guaranteeing stable program funding. 
On the other side of the coin, biennial 
appropriations would be viewed by lawmakers as a reduction in 
their oversight and control of programs. "Some members of 
Congress might view that as a shift in power from the 
legislative to the executive branch" (Blum, 1994, pp. 3). 
In addition, it is very likely that a biennial 
appropriations cycle would be accompanied by more and larger 
supplemental appropriations by Congress in the off-year, 
especially in response to emergencies, significant changes in 
the economy, and hard to predict foreign aid programs. A 
biennial  cycle  that  consists  of  a  single  two-year 
appropriation  followed  by  routine  omnibus  supplemental 
appropriations would not be an improvement over the current 
process at all (Blum, 1994, pp. 2-4). 
c. Effect of Biennial Budgeting on Congressional 
Work Load 
Supporters of a two-year budget say that Congress, 
in addition to agency managers, would realize time savings 
from a biennial budgeting cycle, allowing lawmakers to 
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allocate more attention to budget oversight and other 
legislative matters. 
If, however, the biennial budget timetable is not 
followed or if numerous supplemental appropriations occur in 
the off-year (which is very likely), this could result in the 
loss of any expected time savings from a biennial cycle (Blum, 
1994, pp. 4). 
d. Conclusions 
In his concluding remarks before the Committee, Mr. 
Blum stated: 
Biennial budgeting may...hamper efforts to reduce 
the deficit. Once the deficit problem is in the 
past, biennial budgeting may be beneficial, but 
only if all participants adhere to the system. If 
they do, some of the improvements--primarily, 
increased certainty and improved management 
opportunities for agencies and state and local 
governments--may be worth the costs of having less 
frequent Congressional attention to budget policy. 
But if the Congress does not believe that the 
biennial budgeting system will hold--that is, if 
the system will revert to its counterpart annual 
system because of the necessity or desire to make 
budget policy annually--then disrupting the current 
system by making such a change would probably yield 
few benefits (Blum, 1994, pp. 5) . 
Incidentally, I found it interesting that the GAO 
and the CBO did not discuss, in their testimony before 
Congress, the differing budget milestone timetables promoted 
in the NPR's and the JCOC's biennial budgeting proposals. 
E.  EVENTS LEADING TO BIENNIAL BUDGETING IN DOD 
1.  Congressional Interest in a Biennial Budget for DoD 
This section picks up from the general frustration felt 
by many in Congress in the mid-1980's over the budget process, 
discussed in Section B of this chapter. This frustration, and 
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the specific convictions of the then chairmen of both the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees (Congressman Les 
Aspin and Senator Sam Nunn respectively), were the catalysts 
for lawmakers to search for a better way of managing the 
defense establishment. Specifically the authorization 
committees needed to get away from the particulars of 
budgeting, and focus more on defense strategy and policy. 
Congressman Aspin instituted a Defense Policy Panel 
of the House Committee... to provide an 
institutional mechanism through which the committee 
could take a broad purview of the nations defense 
posture and also examine selected policy issues in 
detail...Senator Nunn, when he became chair of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee in 1986, took a 
number of steps to enable the committee to assume a 
more forceful and deliberative policy role...both 
Aspin and Nunn reasoned that a two-year defense 
budget could help the authorizing committees get 
out of the details of budgeting and into the larger 
contours of policy (Art, 1990, pp. 34) . 
The mid-1980's was also a period of conflict between the 
President and the Congressional Democratic majority over the 
size of the defense budget. 
Congress demanded--and imposed--large reductions in 
what were perceived to be unrealistic budget 
requests, while the administration compromised on 
reductions one year, only to submit requests the 
following year that assumed a return to rapid 
spending increases. In this climate, several 
members of Congress sought to bring stability to 
the defense budget and to jump-start a general 
reform of the budgeting process by shifting the 
defense department to biennial budgeting (Hamre, 
1990, pp. 72). 
2.  DoD Interest in a Biennial Budget 
The  Pentagon,  under  Secretary  of  Defense  Casper 
Weinberger, supported the move to a biennial budget, but for 
different  reasons  than  Congressional  supporters.  "His 
(Weinberger's)  top staff--Deputy Secretary William Taft, 
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Comptroller Robert Helm, and Director of Program, Analysis, 
and Evaluation David Chu--came to favor a biennial budget for 
what they saw as its inherent managerial advantages: greater 
program stability and better oversight of program execution" 
(Art, 1990, pp. 34). 
These were the primary reasons for, and expected benefits 
of, shifting to a biennial budget cycle from Congress' and the 
Defense Department's perspectives. The additional anticipated 
advantages and drawbacks of a two-year budget that have been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, were also relevant 
considerations in the move toward biennial budgeting in DoD. 
3.  From Interest to Adoption 
In 1985, mounting interest in the potential benefits of 
biennial budgeting and growing dissatisfaction with the annual 
defense budget process, for reasons previously mentioned, led 
to the adoption of the Nunn-McCurdy amendment to the FY 1986 
defense authorization bill. This amendment required the 
president to begin submitting two-year defense budgets for FY 
1988 and FY 1989. Following the President's endorsement the 
military departments submitted their first biennial budgets to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
Biennial budgeting first had to be judged in the 
best interests of their respective institutions 
before Aspin, Nunn or Weinberger would favor it. 
Once they concluded it was, they pushed for it in 
the name of national interest. From different 
political motives, then, the Congressional Armed 
Services Committees and the Pentagon came to favor 
a two-year budget. What the former mandated in 
1986, the latter was more than happy to provide 
(Art, 1990, pp. 35-36). 
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F.  THE BIENNIAL BUDGETING PROCESS AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
1.  Planning and Programming 
The shift to a biennial budgeting cycle within DoD 
resulted in changes to the infrastructure that supports the 
building of the defense budget, known as the Planning 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBS began in the 
early 19 60's under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara "in 
order to achieve centralized civilian control over the 
Department of Defense's operations and to allocate resources 
by cost-effectiveness criteria" (Art, 1990, pp. 28) . 
Essentially, PPBS starts with a broad defense strategy 
designed to meet an anticipated threat-(Planning). This 
strategy is then used to estimate the requirements and develop 
programs to meet the threat-(Programming). Finally costs are 
budgeted in support of the approved programs-(Budgeting) 
(Anderson, 1987, pp. 71). 
Two major elements that support PPBS which have been 
altered by the switch to biennial budgeting are the Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM), and the Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP). POMs are prepared by each service, in the Programming 
phase, in response to the Defense Guidance provided by the 
administration and the.Secretary of Defense. The POM details 
program requirements in terms of manpower, force structure, 
and costs for the period covered by the FYDP. The POM 
development process has changed from an annual cycle, to a 
two-year cycle, as a result of biennial budgeting (Anderson, 
1987, pp. 70-86). 
When DoD switched to a two-year budget cycle, the Five 
Year Defense Plan, as it was known prior to the implementation 
of biennial budgeting, was extended by a year and changed to 
the Six Year Defense Plan. Out of convention it was eventually 
changed back to the FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan) . The FYDP 
projects defense spending six years into the future. It is the 
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PPBS controlling document,  approved by the Secretary of 
Defense (Art, 1990, pp. 27-38) . 
This section has only scratched the surface of how PPBS 
works and how it has been procedurally affected by biennial 
budgeting. It is intended to familiarize the reader with the 
POM and FYDP, which are used in the analysis of biennial 
budgeting addressed in Chapter III. For a detailed description 
and extensive analysis of this topic see the two above 
references. 
2.  The Biennial Budget: Method and Reaction 
This section summarizes the DoD approach and 
Congressional response to biennial budgeting, essentially 
recounting the events of the first two-year budget which has 
set the tone for subsequent biennial budget submissions by 
DoD. 
In January 1986 DoD began working on its first biennial 
budget for FY 1988 and FY 1989. The two-year budget was 
essentially two one-year budgets created from the first two 
years of the then Five Year Defense Program. The House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees authorized 6% and 70% 
respectively, of the presidents FY 1989 request, ultimately 
agreeing to authorize 60% of the FY 1989 request out of 
conference. The appropriations committees, who historically 
showed little interest in biennial appropriations, ignored 
entirely the topic of appropriations for FY 1989. 
Many issues contributed to the partial authorization and 
failure to appropriate for FY 1989. A partisan battle erupted 
between the Congress and the administration over defense and 
national policy spending issues, and economic assumptions that 
affected expected federal revenues. "By requesting a two-year 
budget for defense spending while failing to hit the Gramm- 
Rudman target in the second year, the president was asking 
Congress to accept a binding target for defense for FY 1989 
24 
while refusing to identify program cuts for the remainder of 
the government that would be needed in order to reach the 
Gramm-Rudman ceilings" (Hamre, 1990, pp. 75). The stalemate 
was finally resolved by a budget summit in December 1987. The 
result was $19 billion cut from the presidents defense budget 
request for FY 1988, and a $32 billion reduction for 1989. 
Even though 60% of the defense budget was already 
authorized for FY 1989, the Pentagon submitted an amendment 
for the entire defense budget. It was far easier for DoD to 
cut the required $32 billion from the entire defense budget 
than to try and take the reductions over the 40% of the 
unauthorized portion of the FY 1989 budget. Budget amendments 
submitted by DoD for the off-year, are now a routine 
characteristic of the biennial budgeting process (Hamre, 1990, 
pp. 74-78) . 
In subsequent biennial budget submissions the Armed 
Services Committees, in general, authorized budgets annually 
for the reasons Robert Art presents below. 
The Armed Services Committees worried that, if they 
adopted biennial budgeting in parallel with the 
Pentagon, they could lose control over defense 
policy if the Appropriations Committees did not 
follow suit. Authorizing a budget for two-years 
would do little good if the Appropriations 
Committees could have a relatively free hand in the 
second year to appropriate as they saw fit, 
particularly if the U.S. economic situation or 
world events changed dramatically, both common 
occurrences in the last decade (Art, 1990, pp. 40- 
41) . 
In the first and subsequent biennial budgets there has 
been little realized program funding stability (due more to 
the changing defense posture, a declining defense budget, and 
national budget woes than to a failure of biennial budgeting) . 
The Defense Department has, however, been able to spend more 
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time performing program oversight functions through an Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) review of policies and 
service programs during the off-year, known as an execution 
review (Schmitt, 1991, pp. 16-18) . 
G.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented historical background on 
biennial budgeting in the federal government and in DoD. 
Although the experiences with federal biennial budgeting to 
date have been less than triumphant, current proposals are 
being promoted in Congress and by the Clinton administration. 
Motives for supporting or opposing a biennial budget cycle, 
particularly two-year appropriations, depend on one's 
perspective. 
In the next chapter, the effects of a two-year budget 
cycle on DoN's and DoD's budget formulation and implementation 
process and its impact on POM development within DoN will be 
explored. Realized advantages and disadvantages of biennial 
budgeting in DoN and the likely future progression of biennial 
budgeting in DoD and in the federal government are also 
examined, from the perspective of defense budget and program 
professionals. 
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III.  ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Under the current process of biennial budgeting, 
authorizations and appropriations are still executed annually, 
even though the Department of Defense (DoD) must submit its 
two one-year budgets (two individual budgets, one for each 
fiscal year in the biennium) to Congress once every two years. 
The Pentagon presents an amended defense budget via the 
administration to Congress for the off year in early February, 
four months into the start of the biennial period. 
The only exception, since the first biennial budget 
submission for Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 and FY 1989, was the 
first budget submitted by the Clinton administration, which 
contained a one year defense budget for FY 1994 followed by a 
separate defense budget submission for FY 1995. The first 
biennial defense budget under President Clinton will be the FY 
1996/FY 1997 submission. 
In the course of writing this thesis, I have conducted 
comprehensive phone interviews with branch heads from the Navy 
Comptroller's office (NAVCOMPT), budget officers and deputy 
comptrollers of major claimants, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) budget 
analysts, House and Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, 
and Defense Authorization Committee staff members, and Program 
Managers (PMs) in the Department of Defense. 
This chapter's analysis of the effects of biennial 
budgeting will focus on the experiences, evaluations and 
judgments of those interviewed--who built and executed annual 
defense budgets, and who now participate in the planning and 
implementation of the two-year defense budget cycle. A broad 
panorama of the consequences of biennial budgeting will be 
painted. As mentioned in Chapter II, the details of the 
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procedural changes to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) that have resulted from the switch to biennial 
budgeting will not be addressed in this study. An in-depth 
description of these procedural and administrative changes can 
be found in Art (1990, 27-38) and Anderson (1987, 70-86). 
There  was  virtually  universal  agreement  among  the 
professionals interviewed on two points: 
1. Budget execution has not changed since DoD began 
submitting biennial budgets because Congress does not 
appropriate biennially. 
2. Overall the current biennial budgeting process is not 
effective, although some ancillary benefits have been 
realized. 
The thoughts of one NAVCOMPT Branch Head captured the 
general feeling of many of his peers: 
We are paying lip service to a program that will 
never be implemented as designed. Congress does not 
want to compromise the flexibility it has in 
shaping the DoD budget each year for defense 
planning reasons, domestic policy reasons, and for 
pork barrel reasons. 
Based on interviews conducted and the study of pertinent 
material, this chapter will address all but one of the 
research questions posed in Chapter I, specifically: 
• What effect has biennial budgeting had on the 
Department of the Navy's budget planning and 
implementation process? 
• What have been the realized advantages and limitations 
of biennial budgeting within DoD and the Department of 
the Navy (DoN)? 
• What has been the impact of biennial budgeting on the 
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process? 
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• Given the current political and budgetary climate, what 
is the likely future progression of biennial budgeting 
in DoD and in the federal government? 
B.  REALIZED STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PRESENT BIENNIAL 
BUDGETING PROCESS 
In Chapter II, arguments for and against biennial 
budgeting (in an environment where the President submits a 
budget every two years, authorization committees approve full 
two-year budgets, budget resolutions are adopted every two 
years and appropriations are established for the entire 
biennial period) were presented from the official perspective 
of various federal agencies and Congressional members. 
The strengths and weaknesses and rationale discussed 
below, reflect the personal experiences, ideas and opinions of 
DoD budget analysts, PMs, and Congressional and OMB staff 
personnel interviewed. 
A majority of the defense budget professionals 
interviewed believed that if. biennial budgeting was executed 
as designed, with two-year appropriations, it would contribute 
to better decision making and more program stability, while 
simplifying and stabilizing a burdensome and very time 
consuming process. A two-year budget and appropriations cycle 
would allow policy makers more time to establish stable 
funding levels for procurement programs, evaluate current and 
prospective policy, and conduct more practical and effective 
long range planning. 
When discussing strengths and weaknesses of the biennial 
budgeting process in DoD since the department's first biennial 
budget submission for FY 1988 and FY 1989, I asked that 
respondents address realized advantages and drawbacks rather 
than quoting the advertised benefits and detriments of a two- 
year budget cycle. An extensive discussion of the anticipated 
benefits and drawbacks of a biennial budget cycle in DoD and 
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the federal government can be found in Anderson (1987, pp. 17- 
20) and in Art (1990, pp. 48-55). 
Individuals working in policy, operations and procurement 
departments generally emphasized the beneficial aspects of 
biennial budgeting. These individuals felt that two-year 
budgeting in DoD is helpful because it frees up a marginal 
amount of time within DoD to step back and evaluate policy and 
program implementation. 
Although budget officers and budget analysts within DoD 
agree there are some advantages to biennial budgeting, they 
felt there was no time savings realized for them, in a two- 
year budget cycle, and in fact the work load and total time 
spent on budgeting and amending budgets has remained constant 
or even increased. 
1. Strength: Careful Consideration and a Defendable Plan 
One realized benefit of biennial budgeting recognized by 
nearly every expert interviewed, is that a two year budget 
strongly encourages internal decision makers (from field to 
headquarters levels) to carefully consider what the services 
longer term programming and spending plans are and how to 
adequately defend  those plans  against   critics  and Congress. 
When the President submits his FY 1996/FY 1997 budget to 
Congress, legislators will have two opportunities to review 
and modify FY 1997's budget submission. First, with the FY 
1996 budget review and again when the amended FY 1997 budget 
is submitted in February 1996. One DoD budget analyst stated: 
Even though Congress appropriates annually, DoD 
must be as careful in formulating the budget for 
the second year of the biennium, as we are for the 
first year. The budget process is based on track 
records and there is an inherent danger to the 
services (programs and funding levels) in 
submitting budget updates that are not consistent 
with the original submission. 
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As will be presented later, a number of managers consider 
Congress' opportunity to look at the off-year budget twice as 
a disadvantage of the current budget process. Many individuals 
interviewed, however, felt that this system has provided the 
Navy and the other services incentive to accurately and 
thoroughly plan and prepare their budget submission for the 
two-year period-a benefit of biennial budgeting. As one DoD 
analyst stated, "...the services and OSD have a clearer 
picture of the defense force structure and have a reasonable 
projection of what program execution will be." 
2. Strength: An Improved Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) Process 
Another advantage of biennial budgeting cited mostly by 
analysts and managers working in policy, operations and 
procurement departments, is that a full blown POM is prepared 
every other year instead of annually by the services. The POM 
is updated for the off-year much like the budget is. This 
update was labeled a "program review" by most NAVCOMPT 
managers. Congressional staffers and DoD analysts referred to 
it as the "POM update". I will use the phrase "POM update" for 
consistency. 
DoD analysts and Navy managers interviewed stated that 
the POM updates have been marginally less work intensive and 
less time consuming than a full blown POM development. The 
time and work savings though noticeable, has been minimal due 
to continuing defense downsizing and the transformation of 
defense roles over the last few years. 
Even though rather extensive revisions to the POM have 
been necessary in the POM update, time savings has been 
realized enabling the services to devote more time to program 
planning and evaluation. 
One DoD analyst stated: "In an environment of greater 
defense policy and budgeting stability, the nature of POM 
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updates may shift from extensive revision to minor update 
providing more time for the services to evaluate their success 
in meeting objectives." 
3. Weakness: Annual Appropriations and Program 
Instability 
Not surprisingly, many managers interviewed within the 
DoD cited Congress' unwillingness to appropriate for a two- 
year period as a major weakness and inhibitor of a successful 
and beneficial biennial budgeting process. Individuals in 
procurement and policy departments and PMs noted various 
detrimental effects of continued annual appropriations on 
procurement programs including: 
• The inability to buy more of a product at one time 
resulting in the loss of potential price discounts 
through economic order quantities. 
• Less program stability due to more frequent program 
funding variations. This lack of program stability 
adversely impacts contractors and the services in their 
long term planning. 
Two observers held a different perspective than most of 
the individuals interviewed. One, a professional staff member 
of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee stated: 
Program stability is what supporters (of biennial 
budgeting) say will result from biennial 
appropriations. You will find, however, that the 
biggest cause of instability in defense programs is 
due to changes submitted by the services, not 
changes made by Congress. Look at the A-12....It is 
planning and execution stability that gives a 
program stability, not biennial budgeting....The 
budget approval process does not cause instability. 
It (instability) is simply the nature of (national) 
defense. 
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The deputy comptroller of a major claimant declared: 
What is required is a national agreement between 
Congress and the administration on defense spending 
levels that are founded on a sound fiscal basis. If 
spending projection and execution are steady, then 
there is program stability. Whether or not it's the 
FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan) or biennial 
budgeting or annual budgeting is not the issue. 
4. Weakness: Two Chances to Cut 
As previously mentioned, a few managers considered 
Congress' opportunity to look at the off-year budget twice, as 
a disadvantage of the current budget process. While discussing 
weaknesses of biennial budgeting, one NAVCOMPT branch head 
stated: "When we (DON) submit a biennial budget, we are giving 
Congress two chances to cut the out-year." 
5. Weakness: More Work for Budgeteers 
Another disadvantage realized predominantly among budget 
analysts and budget officers is that the preparation of a 
biennial budget followed by an amended budget the next year, 
is more work and more time consuming than the preparation of 
two separate annual budgets. A branch head at NAVCOMPT 
explained: 
Any benefits in (the ability to perform) long term 
planning have been offset by the extra time, 
workload and administration that goes into building 
the two, one-year budgets--that make up our 
biennial budget — followed the next year by 
preparing a budget amendment for the off-year. 
Under annual budgeting, we prepared two budgets in 
two years. Now, we prepare about two-and-one-half 
budgets over the same two year period. 
The budget officer of a major claimant stated simply: 
"There is a lot of extra work that goes into the biennial 
budget cycle in DoD." 
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Even in the hypothetical case of a two-year 
appropriations cycle there would be little time savings if 
any, for budget analysts and comptrollers. Many share the view 
of the Congressional Budget Office on this issue presented in 
Chapter II: Biennial appropriations, if enacted, would likely 
result in numerous changes including, more and larger 
supplemental appropriations by Congress in the off-year, 
extensive reprogramming, and enormous budget amendments 
occurring throughout the two-year budget cycle. This type of 
situation would not be an improvement over the current 
process, and may actually be a detriment to the budgeting 
mechanism. Professional staff members from the House and 
Senate Defense Appropriation Subcommittees shared this view as 
well. 
C.  THE EFFECT OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING ON DON BUDGET PLANNING 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Budget Planning: The effect of biennial budgeting on 
budget planning was introduced in Section B of this chapter-- 
considered by most to have a beneficial effect on planning, 
but by some to be an additional burden on the budget planning 
process. As a rule, the managers and staff interviewed agreed 
that a biennial budgeting cycle has persuaded managers and 
planners within DoD to carefully consider what the services 
longer term programming and spending plans are and to be able 
to capably defend those plans and programs against critics and 
Congress. 
Budgeting and to some extent reliable programming focused 
on the short term under annual budgeting. This resulted in one 
year of budget quality figures, and four years (the remaining 
portion of the then, Five Year Defense Plan which in 
concurrence with the implementation of biennial budgeting 
became the Future Years Defense Plan) of budget estimates that 
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were not well planned or evaluated. The second through fifth 
years, or out years, of the Five Year Defense Plan under 
annual budgeting were by one account: 
...not practical and not real useful because of the 
short term focus of the participants... Only the 
first year of the (Five Year Defense) Plan was 
accurate (DoD budget analyst). 
Under a biennial budgeting cycle, DoD submits two years 
of budget quality figures enabling the services and Congress 
to better plan and evaluate programs over a longer time 
horizon. Another DoD budget analyst commenting on the effect 
of biennial budgeting on DoD budget planning, stated: 
Even though Congress appropriates annually, DoD 
must be as careful in formulating the budget for 
the second year of the biennium, as we are for the 
first year. The budget process is based on track 
records and there is an inherent danger to the 
services (programs and funding levels) in 
submitting budget updates that are not consistent 
with the original submission. 
Under biennial budgeting the Defense Department, 
internally, has a clearer view of its projected force 
structure and can attempt to make reasonable estimations of 
what program execution will be. 
Implementation: Every authority interviewed agreed that 
budget execution has not changed since DoD began submitting 
biennial budgets, simply because Congress does not appropriate 
biennially. A NAVCOMPT Branch Head explained: 
There has been no change in budget execution what- 
soever. In the early days of biennial budgeting, 
some programs were authorized for two years 
contingent on the enactment of two-year 
appropriations. It never happened... .The 
Appropriation Committees want to maintain strict 
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control of defense spending, and now, the 
Authorization Committees won't play since the 
appropriators won't. 
D.  CHANGES TO POM DEVELOPMENT 
As mentioned initially in Section B, a positive aspect of 
biennial budgeting is that a full blown POM is prepared every 
other year instead of annually by the services. In an annual 
budgeting cycle, the services construct the POM for the next 
FY before they know what will happen to the POM they have just 
submitted, "...in an annual budgeting cycle, at some point 
service programmers are always putting the components of their 
next POMs together without knowing what the final budgetary 
actions on the previous POMs will be, even though those 
actions will affect the POMs that they are in the midst of 
putting together" (Art, 1990, pp. 46). Most planners and 
analysts interviewed agree that POM updates for the off-year 
of the biennial cycle have been marginally less work intensive 
and less time consuming than a full blown POM development. The 
time and work savings has in general, enabled the services to 
devote more time to program planning and evaluation. 
Program Managers of relatively stable defense programs, 
agree that POM updates for the off-year have required less 
work and time to prepare than a full blown POM development. 
One Army PM, however, who oversaw a defense program that was 
a victim of the defense draw-down had a different perspective: 
The change (to the POM process) is cosmetic and 
conceptual. The (off-year) updates are as intense 
and vigorous as the initial development. There is 
no realized advantage in this for the PM. 
Analysts and planners at headquarters level, in general, 
view biennial POM submissions as a time saver which has 
allowed policy makers to focus more on the services program 
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planning and evaluation. From the Program Manager's 
perspective, however, workload reduction and additional time 
for analysis is more a function of program funding and 
scheduling stability, than the frequency of service POM 
inputs. 
E.  THE ENVISIONED COURSE OF BIENNIAL BUDGETING 
Most of the managers and analysts I spoke with in the 
course of my research were aware that biennial budgeting is 
being promoted by the current administration. Discussed in 
detail in Chapter II, the Vice Presidents National Performance 
Review (NPR) is recommending that the entire budget cycle be 
changed from an annual to a biennial process. Under this 
system the President would present budgets every two years, 
authorization committees would approve full two year budgets, 
budget resolutions would be adopted every two years and 
appropriations would be established for the entire biennial 
period. 
In recent testimony before Congress the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) offered support for portions of the 
NPR's biennial budgeting proposal, specifically associated 
with multi-year authorizations and budget resolutions. In 
contrast to the NPR's promotion of biennial appropriations, 
GAO supports a continued annual appropriations cycle. 
The NPR and GAO proposals, in addition to the recent 
views and recommendations on the implementation and structure 
of a biennial budgeting process made by, the Joint (House and 
Senate) Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC), and 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), were also presented in 
detail in Chapter II. 
Given the current administration's push for a two-year 
budget cycle and the GAO's position, individuals interviewed 
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were asked.to forecast the future course and development of 
biennial budgeting. 
1.  Would Congress  be more  apt  to  enact  two-year 
appropriations if all executive agencies,  not just DoD, 
submitted  biennial  budgets  as  outlined  in  the  NPR 
recommendat ions ? 
Almost every individual interviewed felt that Congress 
would never move to an across the board biennial 
appropriations cycle regardless of what other agencies did. 
This view is primarily due the perceived reluctance of 
Congress to give up, to any degree or frequency, authority or 
oversight of defense programs or the defense budget. Similar 
concerns over a possible shift in the relative balance of 
power between the legislative and executive branches, were 
raised by both the GAO and CBO in evaluating biennial budget 
proposals. Only a small number of managers felt that two-year 
appropriations would happen if all agencies submitted biennial 
budgets. 
The view of a professional staff member of the House 
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee incorporated the 
perceptions and beliefs of many managers and analysts I spoke 
with: 
Congress does not want to lose the control and 
flexibility that annual appropriations provide. 
Defense policy is inherently uncertain and 
changing.... Furthermore enacting multi-year 
appropriations for defense, the biggest 
discretionary spender, is not consistent with 
deficit reduction. 
2. If adopted, will the GAO's biennial budgeting proposal 
offer any advantages to DoD over the current two year budget 
submission cycle? 
Individuals interviewed saw little benefit to DoD from 
the GAO's proposal to establish multi-year authorizations, and 
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biennial budget resolutions while maintaining an annual 
appropriations cycle. The longer term resolution and 
authorization cycles were generally viewed by managers and 
analysts as a way that authorization and budget committees 
could potentially save time in the budget process. Most, 
however, felt there would be little advantage to service 
programmers and no realized benefit to budgeteers resulting 
from the GAO's recommendation. 
An OMB budget examiner in the National Security division 
discussing the GAO's proposal stated: 
Planning and appropriating for DoD is less stable 
than for other more steady spenders. Even though 
(with multi-year authorizations) we would know 
where the numbers are, it (multi-year 
authorizations) wouldn't mean much to long term 
planning and program stability within DoD if 
Congress continued appropriating annually. 
A recently retired Program Manager within DoD, asserted: 
There always has been, and always will be, a 
disconnect between Defense Authorization and 
Defense Appropriation Committees. This (the GAO 
proposal) would just exacerbate this difference, 
and wouldn't benefit service planning or program 
stability in the least. 
3. What is the future of biennial budgeting? 
An overwhelming majority of analysts, budgeteers and 
staff members interviewed believed that despite the current 
push for biennial budgeting by the Clinton administration and 
certain forces in Congress, the Federal Government will never 
implement a biennial budgeting system that includes a two year 
appropriations cycle for DoD. 
The GAO proposal which promotes multi-year budget 
resolutions and authorizations while preserving the current 
annual appropriations cycle is seen as a possible,  but 
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unlikely future course in the evolution of biennial budgeting 
at the Federal level. 
The projected outlook by most managers is that DoD will 
continue the status quo, submitting biennial budgets to 
Congress every two years followed in the off-year by rather 
extensive budget amendments. The future of biennial budgeting 
in the estimation of the budget officer for a major claimant, 
reflected the view held by many of the DoD analysts, PM's, 
budgeteers, managers and Congressional staff interviewed: 
I don't see any changes to the current system 
happening. Enough good comes out of it (biennial 
budget submissions by DoD) that the system can't 
rebel like it did when we shifted to zero-base 
budgeting. The current process satisfies decision 
and planning requirements within DoD. On the other 
hand due to the nature of the defense draw down and 
the intrinsic nature of people (Congress) to meddle 
I don't think we (DoD) will ever see two-year 
appropriations or realize the benefits of program 
stability and execution flexibility that would 
result. 
A professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee commenting on the future of biennial budgeting 
stated: 
I believe we will continue to see a push for it, 
but I don't think the prospects (of successful 
implementation) are very good. The appropriation 
committees don't want to loose the control and 
flexibility that annual appropriations afford.... 
The size and rate of the defense draw down is not a 
factor. It is going to take a train wreck before 
Congress will appropriate for a two-year period. 
A professional staff member of the Senate Appropriations 
Defense Subcommittee held a view strikingly different than 
most of the other professionals that I spoke with. He saw 
absolutely no benefit in any aspect of the current biennial 
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budgeting process within DoD and felt that an attempt to move 
the entire budget process to a two year cycle "...made no 
sense, is a total waste of time and is unrealistic in an 
environment of run-away deficits, and a wildly changing 
international situation that has resulted in a continuously 
changing force structure." He went on to predict that in a few 
years the whole idea of biennial budget submissions by DoD as 
well as the current proposals promoted by the NPR, GAO and 
JCOC would be " ...recognized by lawmakers as a useless gimmick 
and dropped." 
F.  SUMMARY 
By most accounts, the success of biennial budgeting in 
DoD has been limited, due mainly to the continued use of an 
annual appropriations cycle. Although changes to budget 
planning and the POM process have resulted from the 
implementation of a two-year budget cycle, there is no 
universal agreement that these changes have been advantageous 
to all in the DoD budget process. 
Individuals working in policy, operations and procurement 
departments generally emphasize the beneficial aspects of 
biennial budgeting and feel it frees up a marginal amount of 
time to step back and evaluate policy and program 
implementation. Budget officers and budget analysts within DoD 
agree there are some advantages to biennial budgeting, 
however, they felt there was no time savings realized for 
them, in a two-year budget cycle, and in fact the work load 
and time spent on budgeting and amending budgets has remained 
constant or even increased. 
A majority of analysts, budgeteers and staff members 
interviewed, believed that despite the current push for 
biennial budgeting by the Clinton administration and certain 
forces in Congress, a Federal biennial budgeting system that 
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includes a two year appropriations cycle, will never be 
implemented. Further, the GAO proposal which promotes multi- 
year budget resolutions and authorizations while maintaining 
an annual appropriations cycle is not viewed as beneficial to 
DoD, or as a likely future course in the evolution of Federal 
biennial budgeting. 
The projected outlook by most managers is that DoD will 
continue the status quo, submitting biennial budgets to 
Congress every two years followed in the off-year by rather 
extensive budget amendments. The issue will continue to evolve 
over the next several years as a result of the recently 
renewed interest in a biennial budget. 
The next chapter will present similarities and 
distinctions between biennial budgeting at the federal and 
state level. Relevant attributes of state biennial budgeting 
experiences that may be applied to the federal biennial budget 
process, will be presented. Trends in biennial budgeting at 
the state level and factors affecting whether states use 
biennial budgeting, will also be examined. 
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IV.  BIENNIAL BUDGETING AT THE STATE LEVEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although a relatively new development for the federal 
government, many states have used biennial budgeting for 
years. Currently 2 0 states employ biennial budget cycles, 
operating under varying schedules and styles of execution. 
Although budget size, scope, procedure, and form vary among 
states and between states and the federal government, 
reflection on state budgeting experiences can provide useful 
insight for federal policy makers that may be applied to 
biennial budgeting decisions at the federal level. 
This chapter will introduce state trends in biennial 
budgeting, and present characteristics of state biennial 
budgeting including factors that influence whether states use 
an annual or biennial budget cycle. The final research 
question will be addressed, identifying relevant attributes of 
state biennial budgeting experiences that may be applied to 
the federal biennial budget process. 
B. BIENNIAL BUDGETING TRENDS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Over the last 50 years, there has been a definite trend 
away from biennial budgeting at the state level. In 1940, 44 
states operated under a biennial budget cycle. At that time, 
however, only four states (New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
and South Carolina) held annual legislative sessions, 
preventing all other states from operating under an annual 
budget cycle (Kearns, 1993, pp. 42-43). 
As of March 1994, 43 states hold annual legislative 
sessions and 2 0 states operate under a biennial budget cycle. 
Table 2. presents current annual and biennial budgeting 
states. Only three states that use a two-year budget cycle 
(North Dakota,  Oregon and Wyoming)  enact a consolidated 
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biennial budget, while the remaining enact two annual budgets 
at once. Of the 20 states that operate under a biennial cycle, 
"...at least half of them carry out a thorough review of their 
budgets before the second year of the biennium begins" (Snell, 
1994, pp. 1) . 
Although the overall trend has been away from two-year 
budgeting, Connecticut shifted back to biennial budgeting in 
1991 after 20 years of operating under an annual budget cycle. 
(Connecticut had changed from biennial to annual budgeting to 
coincide with its shift to an annual legislative cycle in 
1971). Commenting on Connecticut's move back to a biennial 
budget cycle, the states's Assistant Budget Director stated: 
Connecticut was facing some very difficult economic 
times in the late 1980's and early 1990's. By 1991 
we had a $1 billion deficit--extremely large for a 
state with an annual budget of $8 billion. At that 
point we implemented a state income tax and began 
biennial budgeting....Our reason for (switching to) 
a biennial budget: If the state legislature is able 
to look at more than one year at a time, they could 
more effectively plan and program revenues and 
expenditures for the state. 
On whether any expected benefits from the switch back to 
biennial budgeting had been realized, the states's Assistant 
Budget Director explained: 
It is too hard to tell what impact the change back 
to biennial budgeting has made. There have been 
many recent state initiatives that have impacted on 
our budget planning and execution including: the 
state income tax, capital gains tax, a change in 
the sales tax, an expenditure cap, and a change in 






























































* Indicates biennial budget states that enact two annual 
budgets at once. Other biennial budget states enact a 
consolidated two-year budget. 
Boldface indicates the ten most populous states. 
Table 2. Annual and Biennial Budgeting States in 1993 
From: Snell, 1994, pp. 3. 
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C.  ISSUES THAT AFFECT STATE BUDGET PERIODICITY 
In her work, The Determinants of State Budget 
Periodicity: An Empirical Analysis, Paula Kearns conducted a 
study which included an "empirical analysis of the 
determinants of the political and economic factors that have 
been thought to contribute to a state's propensity to budget 
annually or biennially" (Kearns, 1993, pp. 40). This section 
will briefly summarize Ms. Kearns' findings and will also 
present some additional characteristics of state biennial 
budgeting. 
There is a correlation between the region of the country 
a state is in and its choice of budget periodicity, suggesting 
that the political culture (either individualistic, moralistic 
or traditionalistic) of a region affects if a state budgets 
annually or biennially (Kearns, 1993, pp. 48-55). 
Not surprisingly, there is a strong relationship between 
the frequency of a state's legislative sessions, and its 
budget periodicity. A state is likely to budget annually if it 
holds annual legislative sessions. States that hold 
legislative sessions every two years, tend to operate under a 
biennial budget cycle (Kearns, 1993, pp. 48-55). 
The more complex a state's budget is, the more likely it 
is to operate under an annual budget cycle. Budget complexity 
is derived from population, the number and diversity of public 
programs, and the homogeneity of the population. Similarly, 
states with relatively high expenditure levels are more likely 
to budget annually. Currently, as shown in Table 2., seven of 
the ten largest states operate under an annual budget cycle 
(Kearns, 1993, pp. 48-55). 
The executive branch's degree of power in executing a 
budget, including budget cuts and transfers within state 
agencies and programs, does not effect whether or not states 
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operate under a biennial budget cycle. "In this connection, it 
is important to note that state governments do not all 
distinguish executive and legislative authority and the 
separation of powers as rigorously as the'federal government" 
(Snell, 1994, pp. 4) . 
This section concludes with an interesting and unique 
aspect of two-year budgeting in Virginia. Although not a 
specific issue that affects state budget periodicity, it is a 
matter worth examining in the context of this chapter. 
In Virginia, the Governor is limited to a single term in 
office. In that four year term, the Governor submits two 
biennial budgets--the first, at the end of his/her second year 
in office, and the second, at the end of the Governor's four 
year term. It is a point of interest that "no Governor in 
Virginia completely develops and executes a single biennial 
budget" (Brown, 1994, pp. 2). Table 3. illustrates this point. 
Budget Cycle vs. Election Cycle for Virginia 
Budget dates       Prepared by        Current Governor 






















Table 3. Budget Cycle vs. Election Cycle. 
After: Brown, 19 94, pp. 2. 
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The case of Virginia brings out the importance of timing 
of key budget events in the implementation of biennial 
budgeting. If a federal biennial budget cycle is eventually 
adopted, the scheduling of budget execution and planning 
phases  should be  carefully  considered with respect to 
Congressional and Presidential terms of office. In a situation 
where the executive can not completely develop and execute 
his/her budget, the expected benefits that a two-year budget 
cycle offers could be lost. Policy changes and numerous budget 
amendments, that could result from a change in voter 
priorities via a change in administrations, would result in a 
biennial budget process that is at least as work intensive and 
time consuming as an annual budget cycle. 
D. REFLECTIONS ON BIENNIAL BUDGETING AT THE STATE LEVEL THAT 
MAY BE APPLIED TO A FEDERAL BIENNIAL BUDGETING PROCESS 
Many of the federal biennial budgeting articles and 
reports referenced in writing this thesis include sections on 
state budget periodicity, and discussions comparing biennial 
and annual state budgeting. State, and even municipal level 
budgeting experiences, have been given a lot of attention 
recently, due mainly to the many bills advocating a federal 
biennial budget cycle that have been brought before Congress 
in the last decade. Champions and opponents of a federal 
biennial budget cycle look to state budget periodicity and 
success, for support of their position. (Kearns, 1993, pp. 40) 
In her article, Paula Kearns cautions that when comparing 
state and federal budget cycles and operations, there are 
issues that are unique to each process that should be taken 
into account. 
For instance, the U.S. government can run deficits, 
while forty-nine of the fifty states are bound by 
some type of balanced budget constraint. Moreover, 
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the federal government has the authority to print 
money, an option not available to the states. This 
means that revenue forecasts are of potentially 
greater importance to the states than to the 
federal government... The sheer bulk of the federal 
budget suggests that the problems confronting 
federal budget makers are vastly different from 
those associated with the budgets of the individual 
states (Kearns, 1993, pp. 47). 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also states that 
it is difficult to compare state and federal budget process 
for the reasons that Paula Kearns mentioned above, in addition 
to the fact that "governors often have more unilateral power 
over spending than the President does" (Irving, 1994, pp. 2). 
The GAO has determined, however, that there are lessons in 
state budgeting that are relevant to the federal government. 
The first applicable message is that most of the states that 
operate under a biennial budget cycle are small and medium 
sized. The second insight is that the trend in state budget 
periodicity has been away from biennial budgeting (Irving, 
1994, pp. 2-3). 
In 1987, the GAO reported a variety of key factors that 
contributed to state governments historically making the 
change from biennial to annual budget cycles. State executive 
and legislative officials generally gave the same reasons for 
switching. (The boldface points are relevant to budget 
decisions at the federal as well as the state level, when 
considering a switch to a federal biennial budget cycle with 
multi-year appropriations): 
• to gain a greater accuracy in estimating revenues 
and/or financial needs, 
• to improve legislative control over budgetary matters, 
• to avoid having the executive branch spend time 
developing a budget for the second year of the biennium 
when the legislature only "straight-lines" the first- 
year appropriations for the second year, 
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• to be better able to respond to rapid changes in 
revenues and/or program needs, and 
• to make the budget cycle correspond with a change to 
annual meetings of the legislature (General Accounting 
Office, 1987, pp. 13). 
The same report provided reasons that contributed to the 
decision by states to change from an annual to a biennial 
budget cycle: 
• to reduce the time debating the budget in the off-year, 
• to alleviate the administrative burden of perpetual 
involvement in the budgeting process, 
• to impose a longer-range perspective in budget and 
fiscal planning, 
• to permit more intensive analysis of selected program 
areas in alternate fiscal years, and 
• to respond to a shift in political majority in the 
legislature (General Accounting Office, 1987, pp. 21). 
In fact, many of the issues discussed throughout this 
thesis, including the points above, are also considerations of 
municipalities when making budgeting period decisions and 
analyzing biennial budgeting. At the 1994 annual conference of 
the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management, James 
Cavenaugh, an official from Pennsylvania's Municipal Program 
Division, presented local government perspectives on biennial 
budgeting including advantages, and disadvantages of biennial 
budgeting, and reasons why municipalities operate under a two- 
year budget cycle. Many similarities can be seen between local 
government's perspectives on, and experiences with biennial 
budgeting (from Mr. Cavenaugh's presentation), and state, and 
federal government's perspectives on, and experiences with, 
biennial budgeting (as described in this thesis). Local 
government experiences with biennial budgeting will not be 
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specifically examined in this work, however, Mr. Cavenaugh's 
"lessons learned" for executing a successful biennial budget 
cycle are, I feel, as relevant to the states and the federal 
government as they are to municipalities. First, governments 
should have a sound financial infrastructure in place, (e.g., 
capital improvements plan and multi-year financial planning)„ 
Second, and perhaps more significant, the second year of the 
biennium should begin as a plan, rather than an inflexible 
budget (Cavenaugh, 19 94, pp. 6). 
Another aspect of state biennial budgeting that should be 
considered when deliberating a federal two-year budget is that 
most states that employ a biennial budgeting cycle, tend to 
revise the second year budget. While discussing the budgeting 
practices of states that operate under a biennial budget 
cycle, the Fiscal Program Director for the National Conference 
of State Legislatures explains: 
Budgets are written for a specific fiscal year in 
almost every case. Because 13 of the states with 
biennial budgets have annual sessions in which they 
can and do revisit the budget, (Table 2) may 
overstate the extent of true biennial budgeting. 
The extent to which budgets are actually revised 
for the second year of a biennium varies from state 
to state and from time to time, largely depending 
on economic and fiscal conditions (Snell, 1994, pp. 
2) . 
It is vital for decision makers to recall the concerns 
raised by Paula Kearns (above), in addition to the fact that 
most states that operate under a biennial budget cycle are 
small and medium sized, and that the trend in state budget 
periodicity has been away from biennial budgeting (Irving, 
1994, pp. 2-3). It is also important to recognize that the 
four states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, and Nebraska) that 
have changed their budget cycles from annual to biennial in 
the last 26 years, are states that enact two annual budgets at 
once, and have legislatures that meet annually. For these 
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states it is loaisticallv easy, if required, to review and 
amend the second year of their two-year budget. For the 12 of 
20 biennial budget states that hold annual legislatures and 
prepare two distinct annual budgets for the biennium, the 
separation between annual and biennial budgeting is not clear, 
especially if the second year of the biennium requires 
extensive review and amending. 
E.  SUMMARY 
When comparing state and federal budget periods there are 
lessons that are relevant, however, as discussed in this 
chapter, there are also issues that are unique to each process 
that must be considered. Decision makers considering a federal 
biennial budget cycle with multi-year appropriations, can 
examine relevant aspects of state budgeting experiences, 
specifically: 
• the historical trend away from biennial budgeting at 
the state level, 
• the thorough budget review performed by half of all 
biennial budget states, before the second year of the 
biennium begins, 
• the scheduling of budget execution and planning phases 
with respect to legislative and executive branch terms 
of office, 
• the relative size (population and expenditure level) of 
biennial as compared with annual budget states, 
• the extent to which the second year of the biennium is 
a plan, rather than an inflexible budget, and 
• the fact that "forecasting is likely to prove more 
accurate in annual-budget states than in biennial- 
budget states, reducing the need for supplemental 
appropriations and special legislative sessions" 
(Snell, 1994, pp. 9). 
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The fact that 2 0 states currently operate under some type 
of a biennial budget cycle demonstrates that it can work. 
Decision makers, however, who consider the above listed 
features of state budgeting experiences, may be hesitant (and 
justifiably so) to implement a full scale biennial budget 
cycle throughout the federal government. 
In the next chapter, conclusions regarding biennial 
budgeting for the federal government, and within the 
Department of Defense will be drawn, and possible further 
research recommendations will be presented. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
As the size and complexity of the federal budget has 
increased over the past 50 years, lawmakers have been spending 
an increasing amount of time and resources on the annual 
budget process, which has detracted from the time they can 
spend on non-budget issues and activities. Despite the 
additional time and effort devoted to the federal budget, 
frustration and disaffection over the annual budget process 
has steadily increased. 
In the mid-1980's a major budget reform experiment, 
biennial budgeting, was implemented within the Department of 
Defense (DoD)  in the hopes of improving defense program 
stability and oversight of program execution. Since the first 
two-year defense budget, biennial budgeting in its current 
less-than-pure form (annual appropriations and biennial budget 
submissions consisting of two annual budgets) is overall not 
considered by defense budget professionals as effective, 
although some ancillary benefits have been realized. A 
majority of the defense budget professionals interviewed 
believed that if biennial budgeting was executed as designed, 
with two-year appropriations, it would contribute to better 
decision making and more program stability, while simplifying 
and stabilizing a burdensome and very time consuming process. 
It is interesting that individuals working in policy, 
operations and procurement departments generally emphasized 
the beneficial aspects of biennial budgeting noting that the 
two-year budget cycle has freed up a marginal amount of time 
to step back and evaluate policy and program implementation. 
In contrast, budget officers and budget analysts within DoD 
felt there was no realized time savings for them in a two-year 
budget cycle, and that the work load and time spent on 
budgeting and amending budgets has in fact remained constant 
or even increased. 
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The effect of biennial budgeting on the Department of the 
Navy's (DoN) budget planning and implementation process: 
Managers and staff interviewed agree that a biennial 
budget cycle has persuaded DoN and DoD planners to more 
carefully consider longer term programming and spending plans 
and to be able to capably defend those plans and programs 
against critics and Congress. Under an annual cycle, budgeting 
and to some extent reliable programming focused on the short 
term, while under a biennial cycle, DoD submits two years of 
budget quality figures enabling the services and Congress to 
better plan and evaluate programs over a longer time horizon. 
The Defense Department, internally, has a clearer view of its 
projected force structure and can attempt to make reasonable 
estimations of what program execution will be. 
Budget execution, on the other hand, has not changed 
since DoD began submitting biennial budgets, simply because 
Congress does not appropriate for the biennium. 
Realized advantages of biennial budgeting in DoD and DoN: 
A two year budget strongly encourages internal decision 
makers (from field to headquarters levels) to carefully 
consider what the services longer term programming and 
spending plans are and how to adequately defend those plans 
against critics and Congress. In addition, DoD analysts and 
Navy managers interviewed stated that Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) updates have been marginally less work 
intensive and less time consuming than a full blown POM 
development. The time and work savings though noticeable, has 
been minimal due to continuing defense downsizing and the 
transformation of defense roles over the last few years. 
Realized weaknesses of biennial budgeting in DoD and DoN: 
Many of the managers interviewed within DoD cited 
Congress' unwillingness to appropriate for a two-year period 
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as a major weakness and inhibitor of defense program stability 
and a successful and beneficial biennial budgeting process. 
Not all managers concurred with this view, citing an evolving 
defense posture, a declining defense budget, and national 
budget woes as the root cause of program instability. 
Congress' opportunity to look at the off-year budget twice, 
and the necessity of preparing an amended defense budget in 
the off-year, were also considered by most as limitations of 
the current process. 
The effect of biennial budgeting on POM development: 
Analysts and planners at headquarters level, in general, 
view biennial POM submissions as a time saver which has 
allowed policy makers to focus more on the services program 
planning and evaluation. Most of these professionals agree 
that POM updates for the off-year of the biennial cycle have 
been marginally less work intensive and less time consuming 
than an annual full blown POM development. From the Program 
Manager's perspective, however, workload reduction and 
additional time for analysis is more a function of program 
funding and scheduling stability, than the frequency of 
service POM inputs. 
Relevant attributes of state biennial budgeting 
experiences that may be applied to a federal biennial 
budgeting process: 
When comparing state and federal budget periods there are 
lessons that are relevant, however, as discussed in Chapter 
IV, there are also issues that are unique to each process that 
must be considered. Decision makers considering a federal 
biennial budget cycle with multi-year appropriations, can 
examine germane aspects of state budgeting experiences, 
specifically: 
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• the historical trend away from biennial budgeting at 
the state level, 
• the thorough budget review performed by half of all 
biennial budget states, before the second year of the 
biennium begins, 
• the scheduling of budget execution and planning phases 
with respect to legislative and executive branch terms 
of office, 
• the relative size (population and expenditure level) of 
biennial as compared with annual budget states, 
• the extent to which the second year of the biennium is 
a plan, rather than an inflexible budget, and 
• the fact that "forecasting is likely to prove more 
accurate in annual-budget states than in biennial- 
budget states, reducing the need for supplemental 
appropriations and special legislative sessions" 
(Snell, 1994, pp. 9). 
The likely future progression of biennial budgeting in 
DoD and in the federal government given the current political 
and budgetary climate: 
A majority of analysts, budgeteers and staff members 
interviewed, believe that despite the current push for 
biennial budgeting by the Clinton administration and certain 
forces in Congress, a federal biennial budget process that 
includes a two year appropriations cycle, will never be 
implemented, primarily due to the reluctance of Congress to 
give up authority over defense programs or the defense budget. 
The projected outlook by most managers is that DoD will 
continue the status quo, submitting biennial budgets to 
Congress every two years followed in the off-year by rather 
extensive budget amendments. 
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Despite the limited success of DoD's two-year budget 
experience, the movement towards a biennial budget cycle has 
recently been gaining support across party lines, and in both 
the legislative and executive branches. Supporters feel that 
a biennial budget (with multi-year authorizations and 
appropriations) would provide lawmakers additional needed time 
to carefully formulate and enact the budget, enhance program 
funding stability, and provide legislators an increased amount 
of time to deal with non-budget issues. Opponents argue that 
a federal biennial budget would reduce the flexibility and 
responsiveness needed to react to changes in economic and 
national interest issues, and under a policy of biennial 
appropriations, would reduce Congressional control over the 
budget. 
As previously examined and discussed throughout this 
thesis, the relative success of the current two-year defense 
budget, as well as the motives for supporting or opposing a 
biennial budget cycle, particularly two-year appropriations, 
depend to a large extent, on one's perspective. 
After many months of continual research and reflection on 
the topic of biennial budgeting, I do not expect to see any 
change in DoD's or the rest of the federal government's 
budgeting periodicity--especially in the frequency of 
appropriation bills. Perhaps the outlook of one Navy budget 
officer, quoted in Chapter III, says it best: 
I don't see any changes to the current system 
happening. Enough good comes out of it (biennial 
budget submissions by DoD) that the system can't 
rebel like it did when we shifted to zero-base 
budgeting. The current process satisfies decision 
and planning requirements within DoD. On the other 
hand due to the nature of the defense draw down and 
the intrinsic nature of people (Congress) to meddle 
I don't think we (DoD) will ever see two-year 
appropriations or realize the benefits of program 
stability and execution flexibility that would 
result. 
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Both the federal and defense biennial budgeting processes 
may, however, continue to evolve over the years as a result of 
the recently renewed interest in a federal biennial budget in 
concert with the ongoing restructuring of the Department of 
Defense. A possible topic for further research may be to 
examine the progress of biennial budgeting in DoD, and the 
movement toward a two-year budget in the federal government 
over the course of the next several years. 
60 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Anderson, T.J., A Study of  the Effects  that  Implementation of 
Biennial   Budgeting  has   on   the  Department   of   the  Navy's   POM 
Development     and     Budget     Formulation     Process.      Monterey, 
California: Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 
1987. 
Art, R. J., From Budget Wars to "Real" Wars: The Pentagon and 
Biennial Budgeting. Making Defense Reform Work (Edited by J.A. 
Blackwell & B.M. Belchman), 1990. 
Brown, R.D., Deputy Director, Department of Planning and 
Budget, Commonwealth of Virginia. Perspectives on Biennial 
Budgeting: Budget Cycle vs. Election Cycle for Virginia. 
Presentation at the Sixth Annual Conference on Public 
Budgeting and Financial Management, Washington D.C., October 
13-15, 1994. 
Blum, J.L., Congressional Budget Office Testimony on the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994; before the Committee 
on Rules and Administration, United States Senate, April 28, 
1994. 
Cavenaugh, J.L., Municipal Programs Division, Department of 
Community Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Perspectives 
on Biennial Budgeting: Local Government Perspectives and 
Experiences. Presentation at the Sixth Annual Conference on 
Public Budgeting and Financial Management, Washington D.C., 
October 13-15, 1994. 
Clinger, W.F., Hearing before the Legislation and National 
Security  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Government 
Operations; House of Representatives, October 7 1993. 
Congressional Quarterly, December 4, 1993. 
Congressional Quarterly, February 12, 1994. 
Comptroller General of the United States, Biennial Budgeting: 
Summary of the Major Issues GAO/OAGC-84-4, Report B-209565, 
April 17, 1984. 
General Accounting Office, Budget Issues: Current Status and 
Recent Trends of State Biennial and Annual Budgeting. 
GAO/AFMD-87-53FS, July, 1987. 
Gore, A., From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that 
Works Better & Costs Less; Report of the National Performance 
Review,   September 7, 1993. 
61 
Hamre, J., The First Experiment with a Biennial Budget. Making 
Defense Reform Work (Edited by J.A. Blackwell & B.M. 
Belchman), 1990. 
Irving, S.J., Budget Process: Biennial Budgeting for the 
Federal Government. Testimony Before the Committee on Rules 
and Administration United States Senate, April 28, 1994. 
Kearns, P.S., The Determinants of State Budget Periodicity: An 
Empirical Analysis.   Public Budgeting & Finance, Spring 1993. 
National  Defense Budget  Estimates  for FY 1995,   March 1994. 
Nunn, S., Goldwater, Nunn Say Congress Shares Blame for DoD 
Budget   Woes.   Aerospace Daily, October 7 1985. 
Nunn, S., Sam Nunn for the Defense-Georgia Boy Makes Good as 
Gentle Pentagon  Prodder.   National Journal, March 31, 1984. 
Panetta, L., Hearing before the Legislation and National 
Security  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Government 
Operations; House of Representatives, October 7 1993. 
Peterson, C, Assistant Budget Director for the state of 
Connecticut, interviewed in July, 1994. 
Schmitt, J.K., Budget Reform: The Biennial Budget. The 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1991. 
Snell, R.K., Annual and Biennial Budgeting: The Experience of 
State Governments. Fiscal Program Director, National 
Conference of State Legislatures, March, 1994. 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed 
Services: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995; 
House Report 103-499, May 10, 1994. 
United States Statutes at Large 1986-1993. 
62 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. Copies 
Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 
Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
Jerry L. McCaffery, Ph.D., Code SM-MM 1 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
LCDR Walter E. Owen, Code SM-ON 1 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
Victor S. DiRamio 2 
12611 Harbor Drive 
Lake Ridge, Virginia 22192 
Karen Carter 1 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
15 60 Broadway, Suite 700 
Denver, Colorado 80202-5140 
63 
